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Curb  sets  [Basu  and  Weibull,  Econ.  Letters  36  (1991),  141-146]  are  product  sets  of  pure  strategies 
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equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the 
notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each 
player's  set  of  recommended  strategies  must  contain  all  coalitional  best-responses  of  each  coalition  to 
whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other 
players. Minimal strong curb sets are shown to exist and are compared with other well known solution 
concepts. We also provide a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a 
minimal strong curb set. 
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The notion of Nash equilibrium does not incorporate the possibility that groups of
players might coordinate their actions to reach an outcome that is better for all
of them. Aumann (1959) was ￿rst to introduce this consideration into the theory
of noncooperative games by proposing the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. A
strategy pro￿le is a strong Nash equilibrium if it is immune not only to individ-
ual deviations, but also to coalitional deviations. Later on, Bernheim, Peleg and
Whinston (1987) have proposed the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. A
strategy pro￿le is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium if it is immune to coalitional
deviations which are themselves immune to further deviations by subcoalitions. The
main weakness of strong Nash equilibrium and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is
that existence is not guaranteed in a natural class of games, as opposed to the Nash
equilibrium concept.
Basu and Weibull (1991) have proposed a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion
of strict Nash equilibrium: minimal curb (closed under rational behavior) sets.1 This
set-valued solution concept combines a standard rationality condition, stating that
the set of recommended strategies of each player must contain all best responses
to whatever belief he may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the
other players, with players￿aim at simplicity, which encourages them to maintain a
set of strategies as small as possible.
In this paper we introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a
set-theoretic coarsenings of the notion of (strict) strong Nash equilibrium. We re-
quire the sets to be immune not only against individual deviations, but also against
group deviations. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each
player￿ s set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of
each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent
with the recommendations to the other players. A strong curb set is minimal if it
does not properly contain another strong curb set. Think of the set of recommen-
dations to a player in a minimal strong curb set as a well-packed bag for a sports
1Many games of interest lack strict Nash equilibria. A strategy pro￿le is a strict Nash equilib-
rium if each player￿ s equilibrium strategy is better than all her other strategies, given the other
players￿strategies. In any non-strict Nash equilibrium, at least one player is indi⁄erent between her
equilibrium strategy and some other strategy, given the other players￿strategies. Such indi⁄erence
can make the Nash equilibrium evolutionary unstable. See Weibull (1995).
1weekend: you may want to be prepared for di⁄erent kinds of sports since you may
like playing tennis with player 2 or playing golf with playing 3 or playing bridge with
players 2, 3 and 4 or going alone for a jog. Minimal strong curb sets are shown to
exist in general and are compared with other well known solution concepts: strong
Nash equilibrium, coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, and coalitional rationalizability.
Finally, we provide a dynamic motivation for the concept of minimal strong curb
sets. Hurkens (1995) has proposed a dynamic learning process where players have
bounded memory and play best-responses against beliefs, formed on the basis of
strategies used in the recent past. This learning process leads the players to playing
strategies from a minimal curb set.2 We propose a similar learning process except
that now groups of players may play coalitional best-responses. A game is played at
discrete point in time. For each role in the game there is a pool of players. At the
beginning of each period one player is drawn from each pool to play the game in that
period. These players are partitioned into coalitions to form a coalition structure.
Each coalition structure has a positive probability to occur at each period. Players
observe how the game has been played in the recent past, form their beliefs upon
these observations, and select an action pro￿le jointly with their coalition partners.
We show that, if the memory is long enough, play settle down in a minimal strong
curb set.
The paper is organized as follows. We recall notations and de￿nitions in Section
2. We formally de￿ne the concept of minimal strong curb sets in Section 3. We
compare minimal strong curb sets with strong Nash equilibria, coalition-proof Nash
equilibria and coalitionally rationalizable strategy pro￿les in Section 4. We provide
a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a minimal
strong curb set in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Strict set inclusion is denoted by   and weak set inclusion is denoted by ￿. A




, where N = f1;2;:::;ng
is a ￿nite set of players, each player i 2 N has a nonempty, ￿nite set of pure strategies
(or actions) Ai and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : A ! R, where
A = ￿j2NAj. The set of all games is denoted by ￿. For every X ￿ A, let X￿i
2See also Young (1998).
2= ￿j2NnfigXj, 8i 2 N. The subgame obtained from G by restricting the action
set of each player i 2 N to a subset Xi ￿ Ai is denoted ￿with a minor abuse





. The set of mixed strategies of player i 2 N with
support in Xi ￿ Ai is denoted by ￿(Xi). Payo⁄s are extended to mixed strategies
in the usual way. Beliefs are pro￿les of mixed strategies: correlation is not allowed.
The pro￿le of strategies where player i 2 N plays ai 2 Ai and her opponents
play according to the mixed strategy pro￿le ￿￿i = (￿j)j2Nnfig 2 ￿j2Nnfig￿(Aj) is
denoted (ai;￿￿i). For i 2 N and ￿￿i 2 ￿j2Nnfig￿(Aj),
BR
i(￿￿i) = fai 2 Ai j ui(ai;￿￿i) ￿ ui(a
0
i;￿￿i) for each a
0
i 2 Aig
is the set of pure best responses of player i against her belief ￿￿i.
Basu and Weibull (1991) have introduced the concept of strategy subset closed
under rational behavior (curb), which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of
strict Nash equilibrium. Formally, curb sets are de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 1. A curb set is a product set X = ￿i2NXi where
(a) for each i 2 N, Xi ￿ Ai is a nonempty set of pure strategies;
(b) for each i 2 N and each belief ￿￿i of player i with support in X￿i, the set Xi
contains all best responses of player i against his belief:
8i 2 N;8￿￿i 2 ￿j2Nnfig￿(Xj);BR
i(￿￿i) ￿ X:
Curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player￿ s set of recom-
mended strategies must contain all best-replies to whatever belief he may have that
is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. Since the full strategy
space is always curb, particular attention is devoted to minimal curb sets. A curb set
X is minimal if no curb set is a proper subset of X. Basu and Weibull (1991) have
shown that every game G possesses at least one minimal curb set. The set-valued so-
lution concept that assigns to each game its collection of minimal curb sets is denoted
by min-curb. Hence, min-curb(G) = fX ￿ A j X is a minimal curb set of Gg. Sim-
ilarly, curb(G) = fX ￿ A j X is a curb set of Gg.3
3Voorneveld (2004) has proposed the notion of prep sets which are product sets of pure strategies
such that each player￿ s set of recommended strategies must contain at least one best-response to
3The notion of strong Nash equilibrium is due to Aumann (1959). A strong
Nash equilibrium is a strategy pro￿le such that no subset of players has a joint
deviation that bene￿ts all of them. Coalitions are nonempty subsets of players (J
such that J ￿ N and J 6= ?). For every X ￿ A, let X￿J = ￿j2NnJXj, 8J ￿ N.
The pro￿le of strategies where players belonging to coalition J play according to
the strategy pro￿le aJ 2 ￿i2JAi and the remaining players play according to the
mixed strategy pro￿le ￿￿J = (￿j)j2NnJ 2 ￿j2NnJ￿(Aj) is denoted (aJ,￿￿J). For
every J ￿ N, i 2 J, X ￿ A and ￿￿i = (￿j)j2Nnfig 2 ￿j2Nnfig￿(Xj), we denote
by ￿
￿J
￿i the marginal distribution of ￿￿i over X￿J. Formally, the notion of strong
Nash equilibrium is de￿ned as follows. The strategy pro￿le a￿ 2 ￿i2NAi is a strong
Nash equilibrium if and only if, 8J ￿ N, 8aJ 2 ￿j2JAj (aJ 6= a￿
J), 9i 2 J such that
ui(a￿) ￿ ui(aJ;a￿
￿J). A strong Nash equilibrium is strict if the last inequality holds
strictly.
3 Strong curb sets
While the concept of curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict
Nash equilibrium, we now introduce the concept of strong curb sets which is a set-
theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict strong Nash equilibrium. That is, we
require the set to be immune not only against individual deviations (as for curb
sets), but also against coalitional deviations. Let us generalize the concept of best
response to coalitions of players.
De￿nition 2. For each vector of beliefs ￿ = (￿￿i)i2N with ￿￿i 2 ￿j2Nnfig￿(Aj),
the set of coalitional best-responses of coalition J ￿ N is
CBR
J(￿) = faJ 2 ￿i2JAi j (i) 8i 2 J, ui(ai;￿￿i) ￿ ui(aJ;￿
￿J
￿i ), 8ai 2 Ai and
(ii) @a
0
J 2 ￿i2JAi such that 8i 2 J, ui(aJ;￿
￿J





whatever belief she may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players.
A formal de￿nition is provided in the appendix. Every curb set is a prep set and every curb
set contains a minimal prep set. But, minimal prep sets may contain a proper subset of the
strategies contained in the minimal curb sets. Kalai and Samet (1984) have introduced the notion
of persistent retracts which require the recommendations to each player to contain at least one
best-response to beliefs in a small neighborhood of the beliefs restricted to the recommendations
to the other players. Voorneveld (2005) has shown that, in generic games, persistent retracts,
minimal prep sets and minimal curb sets coincide.
4Given a vector of beliefs ￿, a pro￿le of strategies aJ for coalition J is a coalitional
best-response if (i) each member i 2 J prefers to join coalition J and playing aJ
rather than playing her individually best-response against her belief ￿￿i, (ii) there
is no other pro￿le a0
J 6= aJ such that all members of J strictly prefer a0
J to aJ.
Conditions (i) and (ii) captures some rudimentary form of coalitional rationality.
First, a sensible concept of coalitional rationality should prescribe coordination on
strategy pro￿les so that all coalition members have incentives to join the group.
Second, it should be conceivable that members of coalition J will never coordinate
their play on strategy pro￿les that are Pareto dominated. Of course, CBR
fig(￿)
coincides with BR
i(￿￿i) 8i 2 N.
Example 1. Consider the normal-form games G1 and G2.
L R L R
U 4;5 0;0 U 2;0 0;0
D 0;0 3;2 D 0;0 0;2
G1 G2
Take the normal-form game G1 and let J = f1;2g. Condition (i) makes that (U;R)
and (D;L) are never coalitional best-responses for J whatever ￿. Condition (ii)
makes that (D;R) is not a coalitional best-response for J whatever ￿. However, the
strategy pro￿le (U;L) satis￿es both conditions whatever ￿. Thus, CBR
f1;2g(￿) =
f(U;L)g. Notice that the set of coalitional best-responses, CBR
J(￿), may be empty
if jJj ￿ 2. Take the normal-form game G2 and consider the beliefs ￿ = (￿￿1;￿￿2)
with ￿￿1(L) = 1 and ￿￿2(D) = 1. Then, BR
1(￿￿1) = fUg and BR
2(￿￿2) = fRg
and the expected payo⁄s are u1(U;￿￿1) = 2 and u2(R;￿￿2) = 2. Thus, we have
that CBR
f1;2g(￿) = ?.￿
A set X is a strong curb set if the belief that only strategies in X are played
implies that players and coalitions have no incentives to use other strategies than
those belonging to X. Formally, strong curb sets are de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 3. A strong curb set is a product set X = ￿i2NXi where
(a) for each i 2 N, Xi ￿ Ai is a nonempty set of pure strategies;
(b) for each J ￿ N and each vector of beliefs ￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿N) of the players
with each belief ￿￿i having support in X￿i, the product set XJ = ￿j2JXj
5contains all coalitional best-responses of coalition J against the beliefs of its
members:
8J ￿ N;8￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿n) with ￿￿i 2 ￿l2Nnfig￿(Xl), i 2 N,
CBR
J(￿) ￿ ￿j2JXj.
Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player￿ s set
of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of each coali-
tion to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the
recommendations to the other players.4 A set X ￿ A is not a strong curb set if
there exists a coalition having a deviation outside the set of recommended strategies
such that each coalition member is at least as well o⁄ by deviating for at least one
possible belief concerning the play of others in the set of recommended strategies.
A deviation is blocked if we can ￿nd one player who is strictly better o⁄by blocking
the deviation. Notice that each coalition member is allowed to have a di⁄erent be-
lief concerning the play of others in the set of recommended strategies to assess the
pro￿tability of the deviation. In other words, the coalition members may disagree
on where the deviation leads to.56
A strong curb set X is minimal if no strong curb set is a proper subset of
X. The set-valued solution concept that assigns to each game its collection of
minimal strong curb sets is denoted by min-strong-curb. Hence, for a game G,
min-strong-curb(G) = fX ￿ A j X is a minimal strong curb set of Gg and strong-
curb(G) = fX ￿ A j X is a strong curb set of Gg. Every normal-form game has a
minimal strong curb set.
4We assume that players choose pure strategies. However, the notion of strong curb set can
be easily extended to mixed strategies simply by accommodating the de￿nition of CBR. Then,
strong curb sets would still be product sets of pure strategies but such that each player￿ s set of
recommended strategies contains now the support all coalitional best-responses of each coalition
to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations
to the other players.
5We are implicitly assuming that players do not update their beliefs by trying to understand
why some coalitional action is a best-response for the other players of the coalition.
6Similarly to strong curb sets, we can de￿ne the notion of strong prep sets. Strong prep sets are
product sets of pure strategies such that each player￿ s set of recommended strategies must contain
at least one coalitional best-response of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member
may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. We provide a formal
de￿nition of strong prep sets in the appendix.
6Proposition 1. Every normal-form game G has a minimal strong curb set.
Establishing existence of minimal strong curb sets in ￿nite games is simple.
The entire pure-strategy space A is a strong curb set. Hence the collection of strong
curb sets is nonempty, ￿nite (since A is ￿nite) and partially ordered by set inclusion.
Consequently, a minimal strong curb set exists. In the appendix we show that the





where for each player i 2 N = f1;2;:::;ng, Ai is
a compact subset of a metric space and ui : A ! R is a continuous von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function.




, then it is a





behind the proof of this result is the following. In the game G, for every possible
belief pro￿le with support in X, there is no pro￿table deviation outside X (since
X 2 min-strong-curb(G)). Then, there is no deviation from some subset Y ￿ X
outside X for beliefs with support in Y . Since Y = 2 min-strong-curb(G) (as it would
contradict that X 2 min-strong-curb(G)), there should exist a deviation from Y to
XnY . Then, Y = 2 min-strong-curb(GX).
Proposition 2. If X 2 min-strong-curb(G) then X 2 min-strong-curb(GX).
Proof. Let X 2 min-strong-curb(G). X is a trivial strong curb set of the subgame
GX: X 2 strong-curb(GX). We will show that there is no Y   X such that
Y 2 strong-curb(GX). Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists Y   X such
that Y 2 strong-curb(GX). Since Y is not a minimal strong curb set of G, there
exists a vector of beliefs concentrated on Y and a coalition J ￿ N such that each
member of the coalition prefers to play a strategy pro￿le outside the set Y rather
than playing a best-response in Y to his belief. Formally, since Y = 2 min-strong-
curb(G), there exists J ￿ N, aJ 2 ￿j2JAjnYj and ￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿N) with ￿￿i 2
￿j2Nnfig￿(Yj), i 2 N, such that uj(aJ;￿
￿J
￿j ) ￿ uj(aj;￿￿j) for all j 2 J, for all
aj 2 Yj. Since Y 2 strong-curb(GX), the aforementioned deviation of coalition J
does not belong to ￿j2JXjnYj, we have aJ 2 ￿j2JAjnXj. Since X 2 strong-curb(G)
and ￿￿i 2 ￿j2Nnfig￿(Xj) 8i 2 N (since ￿j2Nnfig￿(Yj)   ￿j2Nnfig￿(Xj)), at least
one member j￿ 2 J prefers to play a best-response in X against the belief ￿￿j￿
than playing according to aJ. Thus, we have uj￿(bj￿;￿￿j￿) > uj￿(aJ;￿
￿J
￿j￿) for some
bj￿ 2 Xj. Since uj￿(aJ;￿
￿J
￿j￿) ￿ uj￿(aj￿;￿￿j￿) for all aj￿ 2 Yj￿(Y = 2 strong-curb(G)),
7we have uj￿(bj￿;￿￿j￿) > uj￿(aj￿;￿￿j￿) for some bj￿ 2 Xj￿, for all aj￿ 2 Yj￿. This
contradicts the fact that Y 2 strong-curb(GX) since we have identi￿ed a belief ￿
which is such that BR
j￿
(￿￿j￿) * Y .
4 Relationships with other solution concepts
In this section we relate the concept of minimal strong curb set to the concepts of
strong Nash equilibrium, coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and coalitional rational-
izability. The product set of actions chosen in every strict strong Nash equilibrium
is a minimal strong curb set. Conversely, for every minimal strong curb set com-
posed of one action per player, the strategy pro￿le in which each player selects this
action is a strict strong Nash equilibrium. The main weakness of the strong Nash
equilibrium concept is that it fails to exist in a natural class of games. However, the
existence of minimal strong curb sets is guaranteed in general. The question we now
address is whether minimal strong curb sets allow us to make reasonable predictions
in games in which a strong Nash equilibrium does not exist. We provide below a
game in which a strong Nash equilibrium does not exist but the unique minimal
strong curb set is a proper subset of the full strategy space.
Example 2. Consider the normal-form game G3.
L C R
U 4;4 0;5 0;0
M 0;3 2;2 0;0
D 0;0 0;0 a;1
For a < 4 the game G3 has no strong Nash equilibrium while the minimal strong
curb set is unique: min-strong-curb(G3) = ffU;Mg ￿ fL;Cgg. Indeed, when each
player believes that the other player plays in the set, each player￿ s individual best-
responses lie in the set. In addition, any coalitional deviations outside the set is
blocked by player 2.￿
The collection of minimal strong curb sets may be composed of more elements
than the product set of actions chosen in every strong Nash equilibria even when
strong Nash equilibria exist. Consider again the game G3 for a > 4. The strategy
pro￿le (D;R) is the unique strong Nash equilibrium of the game. The set composed
of those actions is thus a minimal strong curb set. But, fU;Mg￿fL;Cg is another
8minimal strong curb set. As a consequence, the unique strong Nash equilibrium may
not be the only reasonable prediction in this game.
We now establish that if X ￿ A is a strong curb set and a 2 ￿i2NXi is a strict
strong Nash equilibrium of the subgame restricted to X, then a is a strict strong
Nash equilibrium of the original game.
Proposition 3. For every game G = hN;(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni, if X ￿ A is a strong
curb set of G and a 2 ￿i2NXi is a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the subgame
GX = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni, then a is a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the original
game G.
Proof. Consider a game G = hN;(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni. By contradiction, suppose X
￿ A is a strong curb set of G, a 2 ￿i2NXi is a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the
subgame GX = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni but a is not a strict strong Nash equilibrium of
the original game G. Since a is not a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the original
game G, there exists a coalition J ￿ N and a strategy pro￿le a0
J 2 ￿j2JAj which
satis￿es ui(a0
J;a￿J) ￿ ui(a) 8i 2 J. Since X is a strong curb set of the original
game, a0
J 2 ￿j2JXj (a0
J = 2 ￿j2J(AjnXj)). It contradicts the fact that a is a strict
strong Nash equilibrium of the subgame GX = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni.
When a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium exists, its support is not necessarily
contained in a minimal strong curb set, as the following example shows.
Example 3 (Ambrus, QJE 2006). Consider the normal-form game G4.
L C R
U 2;1;0 0;0;0 ￿9;￿9;￿9
M 2;0;1 1;0;2 ￿9;￿9;￿9
D ￿9;￿9;￿9 ￿9;￿9;￿9 ￿9;￿9;￿9
l
L C R
U 1;2;0 0;2;1 ￿9;￿9;￿9
M 0;0;0 0;1;2 ￿9;￿9;￿9
D ￿9;￿9;￿9 ￿9;￿9;￿9 ￿9;￿9;￿9
c
L C R
U ￿9;￿9;￿9 ￿9;￿9;￿9 ￿9;￿9;￿9
M ￿9;￿9;￿9 ￿9;￿9;￿9 ￿9;￿9;￿9
D ￿9;￿9;￿9 ￿9;￿9;￿9 ￿8;￿8;￿8
r
The unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of G4 is (D;R;r), while the unique
minimal strong curb set is min-strong-curb(G3) = ffU;Mg ￿ fL;Cg ￿ fl;cgg. The
9predictions obtained under the minimal strong curb set seem more reasonable than
the one given by the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.￿
Outside the equilibrium framework Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) have
proposed the concept of rationalizability which consists of an iterative procedure
that eliminates at each round strategies that are never best-response. Strategies
that survive this iterative procedure are said to be rationalizable. Basu and Weibull
(1991) have shown that every strategy contained in a minimal curb set is rationaliz-
able.7 However, contrary to curb sets, strong curb sets may include strategies that
are strictly dominated or even not rationalizable.8




We have that the action U (L) is strictly dominated for player 1 (2) but belongs
to the unique minimal strong curb set of G5. Indeed, min-strong-curb(G5) =
ffU;Dg ￿ fL;Rgg. ￿
Ambrus (2006) has proposed the concept of coalitional rationalizability using
an iterative procedure.9 The construction is similar to the original de￿nition of
rationalizability provided by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984), except that not
only never best-response strategies of individual players are deleted by the procedure,
but also strategies of group of players. Strategies of group of players are deleted if
it is in their mutual interest to restrict their play to the remaining set of strategies.
The set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies is the set of strategies that survive
the iterative procedure of restrictions.10
7See Bernheim (1984), Pearce (1984), Herings and Vannetelbosch (1999, 2000) for the de￿nitions
of rationalizability for normal-form games and of its re￿nements. The set of rationalizable strategies
coincide with the maximal tight curb set where tight curb sets are curb sets which are identical
with their own best responses.
8Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) have provided a class of evolutionary selection dynamics under
which strictly dominated strategies do survive for some games.
9Ambrus (2009) has provided an alternative concept of best-response to coalitions of players
and he has o⁄ered epistemic de￿nitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal-form games.
10Another approach is Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) who have introduced the
notion of social rationalizability
10Coalitional rationalizability may have more cutting power than minimal strong
curb sets, as the following example shows.









The game G6 has a unique coalitionally rationalizable strategy pro￿le which is
(D;R;r). Intuitively, player 1 and player 2 both recognize that they have a dom-
inant strategy pro￿le (D;R). Anticipating this choice, player 3 selects r. On the
other hand, fDg￿fRg￿frg is not a strong curb set since the deviation of the three
players from (D;R;r) to (U;L;l) is Pareto improving. The unique strong curb set
of G6 is the full strategy space.￿
However, the converse may also be true. Minimal strong curb sets may have
more cutting power than coalitional rationalizability.
Example 6 (Ambrus, QJE 2006). Consider the normal-form game G7.
L C R
U ￿2;1 ￿1;0 1;￿2
M 0;￿1 0;0 0;￿1
D 1;￿2 ￿1;0 ￿2;1
In G7 the strategy pro￿le (M;C) is a strict strong Nash equilibrium and min-strong-
curb(G7) = ffMg ￿ fCgg. But, any strategy pro￿le is coalitionally rationalizable.￿
5 Learning to play min-strong-curb strategies
We now provide a class of dynamic learning processes in which groups of players
may coordinate their actions. In line with Hurkens (1995),11 players observe actions
played recently, form their beliefs upon these observations, and play best-responses
to those beliefs. The new feature of the processes we propose is that players are
11See also Fudenberg and Levine (1998) or Young (1998). Kets and Voorneveld (2008) have
provided an alternative dynamic learning process in which players display a bias towards recent
choices and choose best-responses to beliefs supported by observed play in the recent past. The
limit behavior of this learning process is shown to eventually settle down in minimal prep sets.
11allowed to play coalitional best-reponses. That is, players are allowed to select
a joint action if by doing so, the expected payo⁄ of each member of the group is
increased with respect to the payo⁄she would have obtained by playing individually.
We will show that the learning processes we propose lead the players to play only
strategies from a minimal strong curb set, and thus provide a dynamic motivation
for the concept of minimal strong curb set.




is played once every period. In each period,
one player is drawn at random from each of n disjoint classes C1;C2;:::;Cn, to play
the game G in that period. These players are partitioned into coalitions to form a
coalition structure. A coalition structure J = (J1;J2;:::;JM) is a partition of the
player set N = f1;2;:::;ng such that Jk \ Jl = ? for k 6= l and [M
k=1Jk = N.
Let J be the ￿nite set of coalition structures. Each coalition structure J 2 J has a
positive probability to occur at each period. Players have information about how
the game has been played in the last K periods. We de￿ne the state space H = AK
to consist of all histories h = (a￿K;:::;a￿1) of length K. In a given period t, for
a particular history ht = (at￿K;:::;at￿1), at￿k is the action pro￿le chosen by the
n players in period t ￿ k for k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Since the choices of the players are
time-independent, the learning process can be described by a stationary Markov
chain on the state space H = AK. Call b h 2 H a successor of h 2 H if b h is obtained
from h by deleting the leftmost element and by adding some element a 2 A to the
right. Let r(b h) denote the rightmost element of b h 2 H. For h = (a￿K;:::;a￿1) 2 H,




i g denote the set of strategies played by player i in the
k last periods, for k ￿ K. Let P : H ￿ H ! [0;1] be a transition matrix, where
P(h;b h) is the probability of moving from state h 2 H to state b h 2 H in one period
and ￿b h2HP(h;b h) = 1 for all h 2 H. A learning process is described by a transition
matrix P 2 P, where P is de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 4. Let P be the set of transition matrices P that satisfy for all histories h,
b h 2 H, P(h;b h) > 0 if and only if (i) b h is a successor of h, (ii) there exists some J 2 J
and ￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿n) with ￿￿i 2 ￿j2Nnfig￿(￿j(h;K)) such that r(b h) = (aJ)J2J
with aJ 2 CBR
J(￿) if CBR
J(￿) 6= ? and aJ 2 ￿i2JBRi(￿￿i) otherwise.
At each period every player chooses an action. This action can be chosen individ-
ually or in group, and is chosen after having observed the recent past play. When a
group of players coordinate their actions, they choose a Pareto undominated action
12pro￿le such that each member of the group bene￿ts from playing jointly. In state
h, if coalition J ￿ N has a coalitional best-response aJ 2 CBR
J(￿) given a pro￿le
of beliefs with support in the set of strategies played in the recent past, then the
process moves with positive probability from state h to state b h in which each mem-
ber of coalition J plays according to aJ. To determine the outcome of such learning
processes, what matters is to identify, for each state h, the set of states that can
be reached from h in one period with positive probability and those that cannot be
reached. Since the exact probability does not matter, we do not have to specify a
particular process of belief formation nor a protocol of coalition formation. We only
require that every such belief with support in the set of actions played recently and
every partition of the players occur with positive probability.
For each k 2 N, P k : H ￿ H ! [0;1] denotes the k-step transition probabilities
of the Markov process with transition matrix P 2 P : P 1 = P and P k = P ￿ P k￿1
for k > 1. We will write h   b h if there exists k 2 N satisfying P k(h;b h) > 0.
Now   de￿nes a weak order on H. We can de￿ne an equivalence relation on H:
h ￿ b h , h   b h and b h   h. Let [h] denote the equivalence class that contains
h and let Q = f[h] j h 2 Hg denote the set of equivalence classes. A partial order
￿ on Q is given by: [h] ￿ [b h] , b h   h. The minimal elements with respect to
the order ￿ are called ergodic sets. The other elements are called transient sets.
If the process leaves a transient set it can never return to that set. If the process
is in an ergodic set it can never leave that set. The elements belonging to ergodic
and transient sets are called ergodic and transient states, respectively. In any ￿nite
Markov chain, no matter where the process starts, the probability that the process
is in an ergodic state after k steps tends to 1 as k tends to in￿nity (see Kemeny and
Snell, 1976). Proposition 4 states that if memory is long enough (K high enough),
the probability that the players are playing a minimal strong curb strategy pro￿le
after k steps of the learning process tends to 1 as k tends to in￿nity. To prove this
result it is su¢ cient to show that each ergodic set Z of every Markov chain with
transition matrix P 2 P satis￿es Z ￿ XK for some X 2 min-strong-curb(G).
Proposition 4. There exists K 2 N such that for all ￿nite K ￿ K and every
Markov chain with transition matrix P 2 P; if Z ￿ H is an ergodic set then
Z ￿ XK for some minimal strong curb set X.
Let L = ￿n
i=1 jAij ￿ (n ￿ 1). Let M = max(jA1j;:::;jAnj;￿n
i=1 jAij ￿ n). Take
13K = L + M and let K ￿ K be ￿nite. Let P 2 P. To prove Proposition 4 we will
show that (i) from any history h1 2 H, the process moves with positive probability
in L ￿ 1 steps to a state hL 2 H such that ￿i2N￿i(hL;L) is a strong curb set, (ii)
from state hL, the process moves with positive probability in M steps to a state
hL+M 2 H such that ￿i2N￿i(hL+M;M) is a minimal strong curb set, and (iii) steps
(i) and (ii) imply that if Z ￿ H is an ergodic set then Z ￿ XK for some minimal
strong curb set X. The following lemma will be useful to prove Proposition 4.
Lemma 1. Let ht = (xK￿t;:::;x1;a1;:::;at) be a particular history. (a) If the players
draw their beliefs from ￿i2N￿i(ht;t), the process moves with positive probability to
an history ht+1 such that ￿i2N￿i(ht;t)   ￿i2N￿i(ht+1;t + 1) if ￿i2N￿i(ht;t) is not
a strong curb set. (b) If the players draw their beliefs from ￿i2N￿i(ht;t), the process
moves with probability 1 to an history ht+1 such that ￿i2N￿i(ht;t) = ￿i2N￿i(ht+1;t+
1) if ￿i2N￿i(ht;t) is a strong curb set.
Proof. Let ht = (xK￿t;:::;x1;a1;:::;at) be a particular history. (a) Assume that
￿i2N￿i(ht;t) is not a strong curb set. Then, there exists a partition J 2 J,
a pro￿le of beliefs with support in the set of actions played in the last t peri-
ods ￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿n) with ￿￿i 2 ￿j2Nnfig￿(￿j(ht;t)), and a pro￿le of actions
at+1 2 A n ￿i2N￿i(ht;t) where at+1 = (bJ)J2J with bJ 2 CBR
J(￿) if CBR
J(￿) 6= ?
and bJ 2 ￿i2J BR
i(￿￿i) otherwise. Let ht+1 = (xK￿t+1;:::;x1;a1;:::;at+1). Then
P(ht;ht+1) > 0 and ￿i2N￿i(ht;t)   ￿i2N￿i(ht+1;t + 1).
(b) Assume that ￿i2N￿i(ht;t) is a strong curb set. Take any partition J 2 J and
any pro￿le of beliefs with support in the set of actions played in the last t periods
(￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿n) with ￿￿i 2 ￿j2Nnfig￿(￿j(ht;t))), we have that every pro￿le of
actions at+1 2 A such that at+1 = (bJ)J2J with bJ 2 CBR
J(￿) if CBR
J(￿) 6= ?
and bJ 2 ￿i2J BR
i(￿￿i) otherwise, belongs to the strong curb set ￿i2N￿i(ht;t) by
de￿nition of P. Let ht+1 = (xK￿t+1;:::;x1;a1;:::;at+1). Then P(ht;ht+1) > 0 and
￿i2N￿i(ht;t) = ￿i2N￿i(ht+1;t + 1).
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Let a1;:::;aT 2 A be such that at+1 = 2 ￿i2N￿i(ht;t)
for all t = 1;:::;T ￿ 1. By de￿nition of L, we have T ￿ L since ￿i2N￿i(h1;1)
contains n actions, ￿i2N￿i(ht+1;t + 1) contains at least one additional action than
￿i2N￿i(ht;t) and the action space A, which is the largest strong curb set, contains
￿n
i=1 jAij of them. Thus, there exists a ￿ ￿ L such that, starting from h1 and
applying ￿ times part (a) of Lemma 1, we have h1   h￿ = (xK￿￿;:::;x1;a1;:::;a￿)
14and ￿i2N￿i(h￿;￿) is a strong curb set. From part (b) of Lemma 1, we have h￿  
hL = (xK￿L;:::;x1;a1;:::;a￿;:::;aL) such that ￿i2N￿i(h￿;￿) is a strong curb set and
￿i2N￿i(hL;L) = ￿i2N￿i(h￿;￿).
(ii) Let X ￿ ￿i2N￿i(hL;L) be a minimal strong curb set. Since K ￿ L + M
and since every strategy in a minimal strong curb set is an element of a coalitional
best-response to some belief concentrated on the set, there exists a set fb1;:::;bMg
that spans X and such that hL   hL+M = (:::;a1;:::;aL;b1;:::;bM). That is, from
hL there is a positive probability that each player i 2 N draws speci￿c beliefs from
￿j2Nnfig￿(￿j(hL;L)) and is assigned to speci￿c coalitions during M periods in a row
(from period L+1 to period L+M) such that each coalition (possibly a single player)
chooses a coalitional best-response in each period and the process reaches hL+M =
(:::;a1;:::;aL;b1;:::bM).12 Once in hL+M, each player draws with positive probability
her beliefs from the minimal strong curb set ￿i2N￿(￿i(hL+M;M)) during K ￿ M
periods in a row. Then, the process reaches history hL+K = (b1;:::;bM;c1;:::;cK￿M)
such that ￿i2N￿i(hL+K;K ￿M) ￿ X. By de￿nition of P, when the process reaches
state hL+K, each player draws her beliefs from X with probability 1 and plays
coalitional best-responses to her beliefs by selecting with probability one actions from
X. So, ￿i2N￿i(hL+K+1;K) ￿ X. Repeating the previous argument, we have that
￿i2N￿i(hL+K+k;K) ￿ X for all k 2 N and for all hL+K+k such that hL+K   hL+K+k.
Once in hL+K, each player plays with probability one actions from the minimal
strong curb set X in all future periods. The set XK thus contains an ergodic set.
(iii) By contradiction, suppose there exists an ergodic set Z such that Z * XK
for any minimal strong curb set X. Thus Z contains an ergodic state h 2 H such
that h = 2 XK for all minimal strong curb set X. Applying (i) and (ii), we have
h   h0 such that h0 2 Y K for some minimal strong curb set Y and h0 is an ergodic
state of some ergodic set W ￿ Y K. Since h = 2 W, we do not have h0   h. This
contradicts the fact that h is an ergodic state and thus that Z is an ergodic set. ￿




such that jAij > 1 and jAjj >
1 for i;j 2 N, i 6= j. We have M = ￿n
i=1 jAij ￿ n. Suppose we are in state hL and
X ￿ ￿i2N￿i(hL;L) is a minimal strong curb set of G. Let k = max(jX1j;:::;jXnj)
and let l = ￿n
i=1 jXij ￿ n. (a) If X = ￿i2NXi is such that every action ai 2 Xi
of each player i 2 N is an individual best-response to some belief in the set, the
process can converge in exactly k periods from hL to hL+k = (:::;a1;:::;aL;b1;:::bk)
12See Remark 1 for an explanation of the value of M.
15with the property that fb1;:::;bkg spans X. (b) If X = ￿i2NXi is such that some
action ai 2 Xi of player i only belongs to some coalitional best-response, the time
of convergence of the process can be longer even more if the same player is involved
in di⁄erent coalitional moves. It can take at most l periods to move from hL to
hL+l = (:::;a1;:::;aL;b1;:::bl) with the property that fb1;:::;blg spans X. This is
illustrated through the following example.









We have that min-strong-curb(G8) = ffU;Dg￿fL;Rg￿fl;rgg and M = ￿n
i=1 jAij￿
n = 3. Suppose the process is in state hM where ￿i2N￿i(hM;M) = A. Let k be the
smallest integer such that hM   hM+k with the property that ￿i2N￿i(hM+k;k) = A.
We have k = 3 since player 2 selects her strategy L only when coalition f1;2g plays
(U;L). Player 3 selects her strategy r only when coalition f1;3g plays (U;r). A
third period is needed for player 1 to play D.￿
6 Conclusion
Basu and Weibull (1991) have introduced the notion of curb sets which are product
sets of pure strategies containing all individual best-responses against beliefs re-
stricted to the recommendations to the remaining players. The concept of minimal
curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium. In
this paper we have introduced the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a
set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Strong curb sets
require sets to be immune not only against individual deviations, but also against
group deviations. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each
player￿ s set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of
each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent
with the recommendations to the other players. We have shown that minimal strong
curb sets exist in general. We have also compared minimal strong curb sets with
other well known solution concepts. Finally, we have provided a dynamic learning
process leading the players to playing strategies from a minimal strong curb set only.
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Appendix
A Existence of strong curb sets
We now show that the existence of minimal strong curb sets holds in general. Let G




where for each player
i 2 N = f1;2;:::;ng, Ai is a compact subset of a metric space and ui : A ! R
is a continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Payo⁄s are extended
to mixed strategies in the usual way. Let ￿(Ai) be the set of Borel probability
measures over Ai. If Bi ￿ Ai is a Borel set, then ￿(Bi) denotes the set of Borel
probability measures with support in Bi: ￿(Bi) = f￿i 2 ￿(Ai) j ￿i(B) = 1g. If
G 2 G, that is, payo⁄functions are continuous and strategy sets compact, then each
set BR
i(￿￿i) ￿ Ai is nonempty and compact.
Theorem A.1. Every game G 2 G has a minimal strong curb set.
Proof. Let Q = strong-curb(G) denote the collection of all strong curb sets of G.
A is a strong curb set of G since for every J ￿ N and ￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿N) with
￿￿i 2 ￿l2Nnfig￿(Al), i 2 N, we have CBR
J(￿) ￿ ￿j2JAj. So Q is nonempty and
partially ordered via set inclusion. According to the Hausdor⁄Maximality Principle,
Q contains a maximal nested subset R. For each i 2 N, let Xi = \Y 2RYi be the
intersection of player i￿ s strategies in the nested set R. The set Xi is nonempty
17since the conditions of the Cantor intersection principle13 are satis￿ed, i.e. (i) the
collection fYi j Y 2 Rg is nested and thus satis￿es the ￿nite intersection property
and (ii) each Yi is nonempty and compact for each strong curb set. It remains to
prove that X = ￿i2NXi is a minimal strong curb set. Take ￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿N)
with ￿￿i 2 ￿l2Nnfig￿(Xl), i 2 N. We have that CBR
J(￿) \ ￿j2J(AjnXj) = ;
for J ￿ N since CBR
J(￿) \ ￿j2J(AjnXj) = CBR
J(￿) \ ([Y 2R ￿j2J (AjnYj)) =
[Y 2R(CBR
J(￿)\￿j2J(AjnYj)) and CBR
J(￿)\￿j2J(AjnYj) = ; for all Y 2 R (Y
is a strong curb set). This establishes that X is a strong curb set. The fact that it is
minimal follows directly from the fact that R is a maximal nested subset of Q.
B Strong prep sets
Voorneveld (2004) has proposed another set-valued solution concept, prep sets,
which are formally de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition B.1. A prep set is a product set X = ￿i2NXi where (a) for each i 2 N,
Xi ￿ Ai is a nonempty set of pure strategies; (b) for each i 2 N and each belief ￿￿i
of player i with support in X￿i, the set Xi contains at least one best response of
player i against his belief : 8i 2 N;8￿￿i 2 ￿j2Nnfig￿(Xj);BRi(￿￿i) \ Xi 6= ?.
A prep set X is minimal if no prep set is a proper subset of X. Voorneveld
(2004) has shown that every game G possesses at least one minimal prep set. The
set-valued solution concept that assigns to each game its collection of minimal prep
sets is denoted by min-prep.14 Similarly to strong curb sets, we can de￿ne the notion
of strong prep sets as follows.
De￿nition B.2. A strong prep set is a product set X = ￿i2NXi where (a) for each
i 2 N, Xi ￿ Ai is a nonempty set of pure strategies; (b) for each J ￿ N and each
vector of beliefs ￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿N) of the players with each belief ￿￿i having support
in X￿i, the product set XJ = ￿j2JXj contains at least one coalitional best response
13In words, the Cantor intersection principle tells us that to show that the intersection of an
in￿nite number of elements of a set Z is nonempty and compact, we just need to show that the
intersection is nonempty and compact for every subset of Z composed of ￿nite elements.
14Voorneveld, Kets and Norde (2005) have provided axiomatizations of minimal prep sets and
minimal curb sets.
18of coalition J against the beliefs of its members: 8J ￿ N;8￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿n) with
￿￿i 2 ￿l2Nnfig￿(Xl), i 2 N, CBRJ(￿) \ ￿j2JXj 6= ?.
A strong prep set X is minimal if no strong prep set is a proper subset of X.
Every strong curb set is a strong prep set, so if a strong curb set is contained in a
minimal strong prep set, the two sets are necessarily equal. Similarly to Proposition
2 we have that, if X is a minimal strong prep set of G, then it is a minimal strong
prep set of the subgame GX.
References
[1] Ambrus, A., "Coalitional rationalizability," Quarterly Journal of Economics
121, 903-929 (2006).
[2] Ambrus, A., "Theories of coalitional rationality," Journal of Economic Theory
144, 676-695 (2009).
[3] Aumann, R.J., "Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games," in
Contributions to the theory of games IV, Princeton Unviversity Press, pp.287-
324 (1959).
[4] Basu, K. and J.W. Weibull, "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior,"
Economic Letters 36, 141-146 (1991).
[5] Bernheim, B.D., "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica 52, 1007-
1028 (1984).
[6] Bernheim, B.D., B. Peleg and M. D. Whinston, "Coalition-proof Nash equilib-
ria: I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory 42,1-12 (1987).
[7] Fudenberg, D. and D.K. Levine, The theory of learning in games, MIT Press
(1998).
[8] Glicksberg, I.L., "A further generalization of the Kakutani ￿xed point theo-
rem with application to Nash equilibrium points," Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 3, 170￿ 174 (1952).
[9] Herings, P.J.J. and V. Vannetelbosch, "Re￿nements of rationalizability for
normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory 28, 53-68 (1999).
19[10] Herings, P.J.J. and V. Vannetelbosch, "The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg
iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability," Economic Theory
15(3), 677-687 (2000).
[11] Herings, P.J.J., A. Mauleon and V. Vannetelbosch, "Rationalizability for social
environments," Games and Economic Behavior 49, 135-156 (2004).
[12] Hofbauer, J. and J.W. Weibull, "Evolutionary selection against dominated
strategies," Journal of Economic Theory 71, 558-573 (1996).
[13] Hurkens, S., "Learning by forgetful players," Games and Economic Behavior
11, 304-329 (1995).
[14] Kalai, E. and D. Samet, "Persistent equilibria in strategic games," International
Journal of Game Theory 14, 41-50 (1984).
[15] Kemeny, J. and J. Snell, Finite markov chains, Springer (1976).
[16] Kets, W. and M. Voorneveld, "Learning to be prepared," International Journal
of Game Theory 37, 333-352 (2008).
[17] Pearce, D., "Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection,"
Econometrica 52, 1029-1051 (1984).
[18] Voorneveld, M., "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior 48, 403-414
(2004).
[19] Voorneveld, M., "Persistent retracts and preparation," Games and Economic
Behavior 51, 228-232 (2005).
[20] Voorneveld, M., W. Kets and H. Norde, "An axiomatization of minimal curb
sets," International Journal of Game Theory 33, 479-490 (2005).
[21] Weibull, J., Evolutionary game theory, MIT Press (1995).
[22] Young, H.P., Individual strategy and social structure, Princeton University Press
(1998).
20Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2009/26.  Johanna M.M. GOERTZ and François MANIQUET. On the informational efficiency of simple 
scoring rules. 
2009/27.  Jean  GABSZEWICZ,  Ornella  TAROLA  and  Skerdilajda  ZANAJ.  On  uncertainty  when  it 
affects successive markets. 
2009/28.  Jerzy  A.  FILAR,  Jacek  B.  KRAWCZYK  and  Manju  AGRAWAL.  On  production  and 
abatement time scales in sustainable development. Can we loosen the sustainability screw ? 
2009/29.  María Eugenia SANIN and Skerdilajda ZANAJ. Clean technology adoption and its influence on 
tradeable emission permit prices. 
2009/30.  Antoine BOMMIER, Marie-Louise LEROUX and Jean-Marie LOZACHMEUR. On the public 
economics of annuities with differential mortality. 
2009/31.  Gilles GRANDJEAN, Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Connections among 
farsighted agents. 
2009/32.  Axel GAUTIER and Xavier WAUTHY. On the nature of price competition under universal 
service obligations: a note. 
2009/33.  Santanu S. DEY and Laurence A. WOLSEY. Constrained infinite group relaxations of MIPs. 
2009/34.  Jean-François  MAYSTADT  and  Philip  VERWIMP.  Winners  and  losers  among  a  refugee-
hosting population. 
2009/35.  Pierre DEHEZ. Allocation of fixed costs and the weighted Shapley value. 
2009/36.  Sabien  DOBBELAERE,  Roland  Iwan  LUTTENS  and  Bettina  PETERS.  Starting  an  R&D 
project under uncertainty. 
2009/37.  Carlotta BALESTRA and Davide DOTTORI. Aging society, health and the environment. 
2009/38.  Alain  PHOLO  BALA.  Urban  concentration  and  economic  growth:  checking  for  specific 
regional effects. 
2009/39.  Alain PHOLO BALA. Gates, hubs and urban primacy in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
2009/40.  Nicolas BOCCARD. On efficiency, concentration and welfare. 
2009/41.  Taoufik  BOUEZMARNI,  Jeroen  V.K.  ROMBOUTS  and  Abderrahim  TAAMOUTI.  A 
nonparametric  copula  based  test  for  conditional  independence  with  applications  to  Granger 
causality. 
2009/42.  Josez  KONINGS  and  Hylke  VANDENBUSSCHE.  Antidumping  protection  hurts  exporters: 
firm-level evidence from France. 
2009/43.  Pierre PESTIEAU and Uri M. POSSEN. Retirement as a hedge. 
2009/44.  Santanu S. DEY and Laurence A. WOLSEY. Lifting group inequalities and an application to 
mixing inequalities. 
2009/45.  Jean CAVAILHES, Pierre FRANKHAUSER, Dominique PEETERS and Isabelle THOMAS. 
Residential equilibrium in a multifractal metropolitan area. 
2009/46.  Daisuke OYAMA, Yasuhiro SATO, Takatoshi TABUCHI and Jacques-François THISSE. On 
the impact of trade on industrial structures: The role of entry cost heterogeneity. 
2009/47.  Ken-Ichi SHIMOMURA and Jacques-François THISSE. Competition among the big and the 
small. 
2009/48.  Frédéric BABONNEAU, Yurii NESTEROV and Jean-Philippe VIAL. Design and operations of 
gas transmission networks. 
2009/49.  Olivier BOS. How lotteries outperform auctions for charity. 
2009/50.  Nicolas BOCCARD and Xavier WAUTHY. Entry accommodation under multiple commitment 
strategies: judo economics revisited. 
2009/51.  Joachim GAHUNGU and Yves SMEERS. Multi-assets real options. 
2009/52.  Nicolas BOCCARD and Xavier WAUTHY. Regulating quality by regulating quantity: a case 
against minimum quality standards. 
2009/53.  David DE LA CROIX and Frédéric DOCQUIER. An incentive mechanism to break the low-
skill immigration deadlock. 
2009/54.  Henry TULKENS and Vincent VAN STEENBERGHE. "Mitigation, adaptation, suffering": In 
search of the right mix in the face of climate change. Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2009/55.  Santanu S. DEY and Quentin LOUVEAUX. Split rank of triangle and quadrilateral inequalities. 
2009/56.  Claire DUJARDIN, Dominique PEETERS and Isabelle THOMAS. Neighbourhood effects and 
endogeneity issues. 
2009/57.  Marie-Louise LEROUX, Pierre PESTIEAU and Maria RACIONERO. Voting on pensions: sex 
and marriage. 
2009/58.  Jean J. GABSZEWICZ. A note on price competition in product differentiation models. 
2009/59.  Olivier BOS and Martin RANGER. All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards. 
2009/60.  Julio DAVILA and Marie-Louise LEROUX. On the fiscal treatment of life expectancy related 
choices.  
2009/61.  Luc  BAUWENS  and  Jeroen  V.K.  ROMBOUTS.  On  marginal  likelihood  computation  in 
change-point models. 
2009/62.  Jorge ALCALDE-UNZU and Elena MOLIS. Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: 
the Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms. 
2009/63.  Pascal MOSSAY and Pierre M. PICARD. On spatial equilibria in a social interaction model. 
2009/64.  Laurence JACQUET and Dirk VAN DE GAER. A comparison of optimal tax policies when 
compensation or responsibility matter. 
2009/65.  David DE LA CROIX and Clara DELAVALLADE. Why corrupt governments may receive 
more foreign aid. 
2009/66.  Gilles GRANDJEAN, Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH. Strongly rational 




Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition: 22 selected papers in public economics by 
Henry Tulkens, edited and introduced by Parkash Chander, Jacques Drèze, C. Knox Lovell and 
Jack Mintz, Springer, Boston 2006 (588 pp.). 
V.  GINSBURGH  and  D.  THROSBY  (eds.)  (2006),  Handbook  of  the  economics  of  art  and  culture. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier. 
J. GABSZEWICZ (ed.) (2006), La différenciation des produits. Paris, La découverte. 
L. BAUWENS, W. POHLMEIER and D. VEREDAS (eds.) (2008), High frequency financial econometrics: 
recent developments. Heidelberg, Physica-Verlag. 
P. VAN HENTENRYCKE and L. WOLSEY (eds.) (2007), Integration of AI and OR techniques in constraint 
programming for combinatorial optimization problems. Berlin, Springer. 
P-P.  COMBES,  Th.  MAYER  and  J-F.  THISSE  (eds.)  (2008),  Economic  geography:  the  integration  of 
regions and nations. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS (ed.) (2008), Au-delà de Copernic: de la confusion au consensus ? Brussels, Academic and 
Scientific Publishers. 
J-M. HURIOT and J-F. THISSE (eds) (2009), Economics of cities. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
C. GOURIÉROUX and A. MONFORT (1995), Simulation Based Econometric Methods. 
A. RUBINSTEIN (1996), Lectures on Modeling Bounded Rationality. 
J. RENEGAR (1999), A Mathematical View of Interior-Point Methods in Convex Optimization. 
B.D.  BERNHEIM  and  M.D.  WHINSTON  (1999),  Anticompetitive  Exclusion  and  Foreclosure  Through 
Vertical Agreements. 
D.  BIENSTOCK  (2001),  Potential  function  methods  for  approximately  solving  linear  programming 
problems: theory and practice. 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 